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ABSTRACT 
 In 2013 the Marine Corps began to reduce end-strength from 202,000 to 182,000. 
To facilitate the force reduction of mid-careerists, the Marine Corps offered Voluntary 
Separation Pay (VSP) and Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA). This thesis 
examines the efficiency of these two programs across Naval Aviator and Naval Flight 
Officer (NFO) Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). VSP targeted Marine Majors 
and Major (selects) with 10 to 15 years of service, providing eligible Marines with a 
lump-sum payment based on rank and years of service. TERA targeted Marines with 
greater than 15 years of service with a reduced retirement pension compared to if those 
Marines had serviced to 20 years. 
 The analysis shows that VSP and TERA worked as intended, accounting for 255 
separations—more than a year’s worth in the steady state—among Marine pilots and 
NFOs between 2013 and 2016. While Marine pilots and NFOs with skill-specific 
qualifications such as Weapons and Tactics Instructor and Forward Air Controller have a 
negative probability of taking VSP or TERA, general demographics such as gender, race, 
and marital status appear to have no effect on take-up of VSP or TERA. However, VSP 
and TERA affects the quality of those remaining in the Corps. While TERA incentivizes 
low-quality Marines to separate, VSP appears to incentivize high-quality Marine pilots 
and NFOs to separate. 
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A. BACKGROUND 
After the end of the Global War on Terror, the Department of Defense (DoD) faced 
a significant downsizing problem. The Marine Corps needed to reduce its end-strength 
from 202,000 to 182,100. The Marine Corps faced end-strength reductions after every 
major conflict since World War II, including the 1990s Post-Cold War draw down. Some 
of the lessons from the 1990s drawdown were “avoid excessive accession cuts, maintain 
FTAP/STAP retention goals, maintain promotion flow points, and inventory must be 
reduced in all ranks” (Tosick, 2012). This means the Marine Corps needed to reduce 
numbers across the force instead of just recruiting less and ending up with an older force.  
There are two basic ways to trim down manpower in the Marine Corps: reduce 
recruiting and increase attrition. To prevent a hollowed force structure and use the lessons 
learned from the 1990s drawdown, the Marine Corps must use both methods in 
coordination. Decreasing recruiting and re-enlistments among first-term Marines is 
relatively easy—planning the recruiting and re-enlistment numbers is not easy and is also 
outside the scope of this study. However, when Marines have over 10 years of service, 
retention rates approach 100 percent due to a high affinity for military service and the cliff 
vesting style of the military retirement system. To incentivize the separation of Marine 
officers who were Majors or Major(select) or had greater than 15 years of service, the 
Marine Corps offered Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) and Voluntary 
Separation Pay (VSP).  
My thesis evaluates the impacts of VSP and TERA on the Marine Corps Aviation 
Officer population during the 2013–2016 drawdown. In particular, I examine who took up 
VSP and TERA, and the examine differences in characteristics of those that separated 
under VSP and TERA relative to the overall and eligible populations. I also examine the 
consequences of these programs on the quality remaining in the aviation community, 
implying the possible tradeoffs in the quantity and quality of these separations.  
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1. Marine Corps Aviation Community 
While the aviation community is a small part of the Marine Corps, it swelled 
significantly when the Marine Corps increased end-strength to support wars in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan and thus needed to reduce its size as part of the drawdown effort. From 
2010 to 2012 the Marine Corps, DoD, and Congress were still determining the optimum 
size of the force (Freichert 2014). The 2010 Marine Corps Force Structure Review Group 
recommended the Marine Corps reduce the number of squadrons from 70 to 61 as part of 
a drawdown plan to reduce end strength to 186,800. Also, there were discussions of 
reducing the Marine Corps manpower even lower to 175,000. In 2012, at the height of the 
plus-up, the Marine Corps had 70 flying squadrons but decreased that number to 64 by 
2017. 
The aviation community is also a very specialized community within the Marine 
Corps. Their qualifications afford them high paying jobs outside the Marine Corps, which 
normally requires the Marine Corps to provide pilot and NFO bonuses to meet retention 
goals. Pilot and NFO response to monetary incentives to separate creates an interesting 
studying since usually the Marine Corps gives them money to stay. 
2. Separation Incentives 
To achieve a drawdown from 2013 to 2016, the Marine Corps began to introduce 
its drawdown programs to Marines in 2012. VSP and TERA were two of many force 
shaping tools the Marine Corps used during the drawdown. Other measures included Early 
Discharge Authority, Selective Early Retirement Board, and Time-in-Grade (TIG) 
Waivers, but VSP and TERA were the main programs with monetary incentives. Marines 
were told VSP and TERA would be offered to overstaffed MOSs, and the Marine Corps 
would only use involuntary separation means on Majors and above in the officer corps as 
a last resort (Tosick 2012). 
Marine officers eligible for VSP received a lump sum equal to 20 percent times 
their annual basic pay times their years of service (MARADMIN 541/12). For a Major with 
12 years of service in 2013, VSP was a taxable lump sum payment of $194,064. Marine 
officers eligible for TERA received a monthly retirement payment using the standard 2.5 
3 
percent multiplier but with a 1 percent reduction per number of years of service less than 
20 (MARADMIN 543/12). In this case, a Major with 16 years of service would receive a 
retirement annuity equal to 36 percent of his/her high three base pay ((16 X 2.5 percent) – 
(20 – 16) = 36 percent). 
Calculations for VSP and TERA monetary incentives were consistent each year 
they were available and across eligible MOSs; however, MOS eligibility changed each 
year. Table 1 displays the Marine Aviation MOSs eligible for VSP and TERA from 
FY2013 to FY2016. MV-22 and F-35 pilot MOSs were the only Marine pilot MOSs not 
offered VSP and TERA during the drawdown.  
Table 1. VSP and TERA Eligibility across Marine Aviation MOSs 
MOS 
Code MOS Title 2013 2014 2015 2016 





































7509 AV-8B Pilot       X X   X X X       
7518 
F-35 
Pilot                         
7523 F/A-18 Pilot       X X               
7525 
F/A-18D  
WSO       X X   X X X       
7532 
MV-22 
Pilot                         
7543 EA-6B Pilot       X X               
7556/57 
KC-130  
Co-Pilot/ AC       X X   X X X       
7562 CH-46 Pilot X X X X X X X X X   X X 
7563 UH-1 Pilot       X X   X X X       
7564/66 
CH-53 
Pilot       X X   X X X   X X 
7565 AH-1 Pilot       X X   X X X       
7588 EA-6B ECMO       X X               
Adapted from MARADMIN 541/12, 543/12, 155/13, 156/13, 154/14, 155/14, 270/15. 
 
Moreover, a waiver for Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) was an additional 
incentive offered by the Marine Corps. ACP is a bonus the Marine Corps offers to certain 
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pilot and NFO MOSs once the pilots and NFOs have completed their initial obligated 
service, which is eight years for pilots and six years for NFOs. ACP MOS eligibility and 
bonus amount changes each year. Pilots and NFOs are usually offered short-term and long-
term ACP contracts. Short-term ACP contracts keep individuals in the Marine Corps until 
13 Years Commissioned Service (YCS) and long-term contracts are to keep individuals for 
15 YCS (MARADMIN 0637/09). The Marine Corps stopped the ACP program in FY 2010 
and started a new Aviation Bonus (AvB) Program in FY 2018 that is significantly different 
than ACP (MARADMIN 614/17).  
Initially, the ACP waiver was only offered to CH-46 pilots, but in FY2015 the 
Marine Corps offered ACP waivers to any MOS eligible for VSP and TERA. Finally, the 
Marine Corps broadened the eligibility criteria for TERA by reducing the years 
commissioned service necessary to retire from ten to eight during the draw down 
(MARADMIN 619/11). They also allowed any Captains or Major not selected for the next 
rank to be eligible for TERA regardless of MOS as long as they met the other 
requirements—between 15 and 20 years of service, greater than 8 years of commissioned 
service, etc. (MARADMIN 543/12). 
Decommissioning platforms such as the CH-46 added to the complexity of the 2013 
to 2016 drawdown because some of their pilots transitioned to the MV-22, which was not 
eligible for VSP or TERA. The Marine Corps had to build two new aviation communities, 
for the MV-22 and F-35 platforms, while simultaneously reducing its overall force 
structure. The Marine Corps built the MV-22 and F-35 communities through initial 
accessions from flight school and transitions from other platforms. VSP and TERA were 
blanket incentives and did not have a multiple to incentivize particular overstaffed MOSs 
relative to others. In light of this, I hypothesize VSP and TERA had differential effects 
across the aviation community, and may not have led to the most efficient drawdown in 
the Marine Corps across MOSs. 
B. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
VSP and TERA increased separations—as intended—during the drawdown as 
shown in Figure 1. The program worked.  
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Figure 1. Marine Pilot and NFO Separations by Fiscal Year 
` 
 
When combining VSP and TERA separations, 255 Marine pilots and NFOs 
separated through the programs and amounted to over an additional year’s worth of 
separations between 2013 and 2016. Probit models show demographic characteristics such 
as gender, race, ethnicity, and marital status do not statistically significantly change the 
probability of taking VSP or TERA. With the exception of the CH-46 MOS, Marines had 
relatively similar taker probabilities within their respective FW pilot, RW pilot, and NFO 
MOS group. Finally, individuals with Marine specific training such as WTI, ASO, and 
FAC/AO show a lower probability of taking VSP and TERA. Since the Marine Corps 
spends a large amount of money to train WTIs, ASOs, and FAC/AOs, it is positive to see 
those Marines have a statistically higher probability of staying in the Marine Corps despite 
the incentives to leave.  
Turning to quality, I use job performance evaluation scores on the FITREP to 
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Senior (RS) FITREP distributions (higher variance) than those that stayed or separated by 
another means. The quality of Marine pilots and NFOs separating also significantly differ 
depending whether they took VSP or TERA. VSP incentivizes high-quality Marine pilots 
and NFOs to separate while TERA appears to have done the opposite. Figures 2 and 3 show 
a relatively greater proportion of high quality officers as measured by RS and RO marks 
that took VSP. Conversely, TERA takers are more likely to be lower quality, although a 
small amount of high-quality Marine pilots and NFOs did take TERA. 
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Figure 3. Kernel Densities for RO Percent Below 
 
 
Since high-quality Marine pilots and NFOs have a higher probability to separate 
under the VSP program, the Marine Corps should consider a quality adjustment offer for 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Workforce reductions are challenging for any organization, military or civilian. 
Choosing whom to layoff or buyout, and when, are the toughest questions organizations 
face during downsizing. At the end of the Global War on Terror, the Marine Corps faced a 
reduction of 20,000 Marines over four years (Tosick, 2012). The DoD uses retention 
models to predict end-strength over a given period of time. Usually the models determine 
which MOSs require retention bonuses to meet manpower goals; however, in the case of a 
drawdown the models are used to determine the size of the buyout necessary to meet 
manpower constraints imposed onto the military. 
A. RETENTION MODELS 
Retention models are used by the DoD to determine the effects of pay (basic pay, 
BAH, retention bonus, etc.) on retention. The DoD has used various models throughout 
history based on data and computing power available.  
1. Annual-Cost-of-Leaving (ACOL) Model 
The ACOL model is one of the first retention models used to empirically analyze 
how differences between military and civilian pay affected retention (Asch, Hosek, & 
Warner, 2007, p. 1091). The ACOL model assumes individuals weigh their current and 
future pay in the military versus potential civilian employment. The greater the ACOL the 
more likely a service member is going to stay in the military. The models use cross-
sectional data to obtain estimates and contain many variables regularly associated with 
retention including reenlistment bonus, unemployment rate, AFQT, race, ethnicity, gender, 
and marital status.  
The ACOL model has many downsides in its estimations, however. Comparing 
military and civilian compensation is difficult because while future military compensation 
is relatively easy to calculate, future civilian compensation is much more complex. ACOL 
is designed to estimate retention in the current period and cannot estimate retention at 
future retention periods (e.g., reenlistment periods or additional PCS/PCA periods for 
10 
officers). Additionally, ACOL does not account for nonpecuniary items such as an 
individuals’ preference for military service over the civilian workforce. It is assumed the 
individual will leave the service if the present or a future ACOL value is less than their 
preference for military service. 
2. Annual Cost of Leaving-2 
ACOL-2 was developed due to ACOL’s inability to estimate multiple periods and 
preference for military service (Asch, Hosek, & Warner, 2007, p. 1092). ACOL-2 uses 
panel data to estimate service members’ preference for military service by measuring 
reenlistment decisions over time. Members that continue to reenlist are determined to have 
a higher preference for military service and their preference variable adjusts in the ACOL-
2 model unlike the ACOL model. 
3. Dynamic Retention Model (DRM) 
The RAND corporation developed the DRM in the 1980s to determine retention 
rates among Air Force officers (Asch et al., 2007, p. 1092). DRM has the same basic 
concept of any retention model where service members compare their present and future 
earnings potential in the military to the civilian market; however, DRM differs most 
significantly from ACOL models in that DRM is able to determine the service member’s 
decision to stay or leave the military across time by allowing their preference for military 
service to adjust dynamically.  
DRM contains complex computation methods; therefore, its use is relatively low 
compared to ACOL. A benefit of DRM’s ability to estimate future periods is its 
applicability to career incentive pays that pay over multiple years (e.g., ACP or AvB). 
ACOL was only able to evaluate the following year’s retention while DRM can determine 
the effect of a five-year ACP. 
4. Retention Model Evaluation 
All retention models suffer from the same set of issues. First, retention models have 
assumptions (e.g., civilian earnings potential) built into them to produce retention 
estimates. If these assumptions turn out to be wrong, the models’ estimates may be wrong. 
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Second, the method of supplying bonuses is not a randomized process and therefor is 
subject to reverse causality. Services will give or increase bonuses to critical MOSs with 
low reenlistment rates and eliminate or reduce bonuses to MOSs with adequate supply. 
Direct causality is displayed by an increase in reenlistment rates after an increase in SRBs. 
This is a positive effect. Reverse causality is displayed by a service increasing SRBs 
because of low reenlistment rates. This is an example of negative reverse causality. The 
problem with reverse causality in retention models is that it is impossible to calculate and 
isolate the direct effect of SRBs. 
B. POST-COLD WAR DRAWDOWN 
In the 1990s the DoD faced a significant drawdown of around 400,000 service 
members amounting to approximately 25 percent of the force (Warner & Pleeter, 2001). 
The DoD has multiple avenues to reduce manpower; reduce recruiting and reenlistments, 
offer incentives for service members to leave voluntarily, and force individuals to leave 
involuntary. This study focuses on the incentives provided for service members to leave 
voluntarily. The DoD needed to provide separation incentives to mid-careerist since 
individuals with over 10 years of service have close to a 100 percent reenlistment rate due 
to a high preference for military service and the cliff vesting style of the military retirement 
system (Mehay & Hogan, 1998).  
1. Payment Incentives 
Each military branch offered the same two types of voluntary payment incentives, 
Special Separation Bonus (SSB) and Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) that affected 
approximately 65,000 service members. SSB offered service members a lump sum 
payment equal to 15% of their annual base pay times years of service. VSI provided an 
annual annuity equal to 2.5% of annual base pay multiplied by years of service for twice 
the number of years of service (Mehay & Hogan, 1998). VSI was similar to retirement 
although it was not index for inflation (Warner & Pleeter, 2001). Table 1 shows a 
comparison of SSB and the present value of VSI at various discount rates for officers and 
enlisted at different points in their careers. 
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Officer         
O-3 with 7 
YOS $34,709  $5,785  $54,129  $46,875  $32,002  $24,430  0.175 70.7 
O-3 with 9 
YOS $46,219  $7,703  $82,908  $69,497  $44,485  $33,085  0.189 52.1 
O-4 with 
12 
YOS $72,006  $12,001  $147,276  $118,005  $71,106  $51,904  0.196 36.2 
O-4 with 
15 
YOS $94,114  $15,686  $208,274  $162,645  $93,722  $67,950  0.198 29.8 
Enlisted                 
E-5 with 7 
YOS $16,655  $2,776  $25,973  $22,492  $15,356  $11,722  0.175 95.1 
E-5 with 9 
YOS $22,283  $3,714  $39,972  $33,506  $21,447  $15,951  0.189 94.8 
E-6 with 12 
YOS $35,549  $5,925  $72,710  $58,259  $35,105  $25,625  0.196 88.1 
E-7 with 15 
YOS $51,216  $8,536  $113,342  $88,510  $51,003  $36,978  0.198 74.3 
Source: Warner, J. & Pleeter, S. (2001) The Personal Discount Rate: Evidence from Military 
Downsizing Programs. The American Economic Review, 91(1) 33–53. https://www.aeaweb.org/ 
articles?id=10.1257/aer.91.1.33/ 
 
2. Implementation of Incentives 
Although SSB and VSI were the same across services, each service implemented 
the programs differently. The Army offered both SSB and VSP to overstaffed MOSs and 
stated it will use involuntary separation if SSB and VSP does not meet the required 
reductions. The Navy offered SSB and VSP to certain MOSs like the Army but said it 
would not use involuntary separation to meet its goals (Mehay & Hogan, 1998). The Air 
Force used the most aggressive approach. It divided MOSs into five tiers. Tier 1 had no 
threat of involuntary separation while tiers 2 to 5 had an increasing threat of separation. 
The different approaches by each service provided researchers a quasi-experiment for 
studying the effects of SSB and VSI. 
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3. Lessons Learned
The 1990s provided multiple lessons for future drawdowns. Most importantly, 
monetary separation incentives increased voluntary separations for mid-careerist. Mehay 
and Hogan (1998) conclude that SSB and VSI’s effect on voluntary separations was 
positive but small for the Navy; however, the effect was significant enough to meet its 
drawdown goal. Mehay and Hogan (1998) highlight individuals not at a normal 
reenlistment point were also allowed to separate during the 1990s drawdown. This is 
similar to the YCS and education payback waivers the Marine Corps provided during the 
2013–2016 drawdown. Combining a small increase in separations at normal reenlistment 
point and a large increase in separations of individuals not at a reenlistment point likely 
provided the Navy with the necessary amount of separations. A separate study, by Asch 
and Warner (2001), on the Army’s drawdown shows SSB and VSI increases probability of 
separation by 13.5 percentage points. 
Service members have an affinity for the lump-sum, SSB, payment versus the 
annuity, VSI program (Warner & Pleeter, 2001). Before SSB and VSI implementation, 
DoD economists predicted half of enlisted personnel would take the lump-sum payment 
option and virtually all officers would take the annuity option because of the large discount 
rate necessary to make SSB equal to VSI. Conversely, 50 percent of officers took the lump-
sum option and over 90 percent of enlisted personnel took the lump-sum payment. The 
difference between the DoD economists’ prediction and the actual choices made by service 
members might have saved taxpayers $1.7 billion in severance cost.  
Additionally, the 1990s drawdown showed the threat of involuntary separation 
increases the rate of voluntary separations (Mehay & Hogan, 1998). The Air Force threat 
of separation tier system gave airmen an additional incentive to accept SSB or VSI since 
the involuntary separation pay was lower than SSB and VSI. Airmen in the two tiers with 
the highest threat of involuntary separation had probabilities of accepting SSB or VSI 6.59 
and 7.35 points higher than Navy personnel that did not have a threat of involuntary 
separation. This highlights a common sense theory that individuals threatened with the 
possibility of a worse payout will accept the voluntary payout; however, it does not address 
the detriment to morale that involuntary separations or layoffs cause. 
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A major concern for drawdown and retention systems is maintaining quality. 
Multiple studies of the 1990s drawdown show the SSB and VSI acceptance rates increase 
for lower-quality personnel. Asch and Warner (2001) estimate an acceptance difference of 
15.7 percentage points between high-quality and low-quality Army personnel: 13.5 
percent and 29.2 percent, respectively. Mehay and Hogan (1998) estimate Sailors with 
lower AFQT scores had a slightly higher but statistically significant probability of 
accepting SSB and VSI during the drawdown. The differences in effect between the 
Army and Navy probably have to do with difference in the moderate threat of 
involuntary separation for Soldiers versus the almost nonexistent threat of involuntary 
separation for Sailors. A recent study on Marine Officer retention during the 2013–
2016 drawdown, concludes that higher quality officers stayed in the Marine Corps. 
The study compared Marine Captains’ FITREPs and Career Designation (CD) statistics 
from the plus-up to drawdown (Bacolod, Griner, & Seagren, 2017).  
This thesis contributes to the previous mention literature by evaluating the effects 
of separation incentives, VSP and TERA, on Marine Corps pilots and NFOs during the 
recent drawdown. Most other drawdown studies focus on the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
and mostly on enlisted personnel. My thesis provides insights on how demographics, 
aircraft flown, and quality predicts a Marine pilot’s or NFO’s probability of taking VSP or 
TERA.  
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the data used to estimate the effects of VSP and TERA on 
Marine Corps pilots and NFOs during the 2013–2016 drawdown. 
A. DATA SOURCES 
The population in this study includes all Marine Corps pilots and NFOs in the 
Active Duty component that held the rank of Captain, Major, or Lieutenant Colonel 
between January 2008 and December 2018. Data of Marine Corps pilots and NFOs who 
separated are observed at the date of separation, while data of those that did not separate 
are as of December 2018. I requested demographic, pay, and FITREP data from multiple 
departments within the Marine Corps. 
1. Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) 
TFDW supplied the Marine Corps pilot and NFO demographic and pay data in 
separate files. TFDW stripped both files of personal identifiable information (PII) and gave 
each Marine a unique identification code in order to merge individuals’ demographic data 
with their respective pay and FITREP data. The demographic data set includes a single 
entry for each individual in the study population. TFDW supplied all variables requested 
to include separation dates and codes to determine how the individuals separated (e.g. 
TERA, VSP, Completion of Contract, or normal Retirement).  
The pay data set includes monthly base pay and ACIP as well as any ACP the 
individual received. Therefore, this data set has multiple monthly entries for the same 
Marine from FY2006 to FY2018.  
2. Manpower Management Records and Performance-30 (MMRP-30) 
MMRP-30 supplied FITREP data for each Marine pilot or NFO identified by 
TFDW as part of my study population. MMRP-30 uses the same unique identification code 
as TFDW so a Marine’s FITREP data can merge with their demographic and pay data. 
Each Marine has a Reporting Senior (RS) and Reviewing Officer (RO) summary entry as 
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well as an entry for every FITREP they received. Each FITREP entry includes all FITREP 
data except names, SSN or EDIPI, billet description and accomplishments, justifications, 
RS comments, and RO comments.  
3. Observations 
After cleaning the data, I drop FY 2019 separations, since they do not represent a 
full year of separations, which reduces my observations to 6597. I drop an additional 86 
Marines with incomplete FITREP data, which reduces the observations to 6511 for any 
models using FITREP data. 
B. VARIABLES 
1. Dependent Variables 
a. Attrition 
TFDW separation data includes date of separation, separation code, and separation 
narrative. Since VSP and TERA were fiscal year programs, I break Marines into separation 
groups based on fiscal year. VSP and TERA have unique separation codes, along with 
other separations categories, that I use to divide Marines into additional separation 
groups—VSP, TERA, Normal Retirement, Completed Required Service, and Other. Normal 
Retirement includes all Marines who retire after 20 years of service. Completed Required 
Service includes Marines separating at a normal separation points prior to reaching 
retirement (e.g., after completing their eight-year Naval Aviator contract). The Other 
category includes Marines separating due to misconduct, disability, or death.  
I split Marines into these groups to track separations trends by fiscal year from FY 
2008 to FY 2017 and develop models to determine the characteristics of the Marine pilots 
and NFOs separating during the time period.  
b. Average Reporting Senior Relative Value – Cumulative 
To capture quality as measured by job performance, I use the Marine’s cumulative 
score on the FITREP and then break Marines into three groups—Bottom Third, Middle 
Third, and Upper Third. The FITREP is an instrument designed to measure a Marine’s job 
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performance. Marine Officers receive a FITREP at least annually throughout their career, 
and on which they are called the Marine Reported On (MRO) (USMC, 2015). There are 
two main quantitative measurements of each FITREP. The first is the Reporting Senior’s 
(RS) Relative Value (RV). An RS is the MRO’s direct supervisor and evaluates the MRO 
on 14 characteristics with a range of 0 through 7 for each characteristic with 0 meaning the 
characteristic is not observed by the RS and not graded, 1 is adverse, and 7 means the 
Marine is of the highest quality in that evaluated characteristic (USMC, 2015).  
The 14 grades are then averaged to get an RS average. The RV rescales the RS 
average into an 80 to 100 score with 90 equaling average for that respective RS. A MRO 
will receive a RS RV at Processing score that stays the same throughout the MRO’s career. 
In addition, the MRO receives a RS RV – Cumulative score, which adjusts as the RS writes 
more FITREPs on Marines of the same rank as the MRO. The RS RV – Cumulative is 
designed to account for fluctuations of an RS as the RS writes more FITREPs throughout 
their career. MROs can use the RS RV – Cumulative to judge their performance relative to 
other Marines. 
The Average RS RV – Cumulative is an average of the MRO’s history of the RS 
RVs; it is cumulative throughout a Marines’ career regardless of rank. This score is on the 
same 80 to 100 scale with 90 equaling average. I use this variable to measure the stock or 
cumulative quality of a Marine’s job performance, in assessing the effect separation 
incentives had on the quality of Marines separating. Figure 4 in Appendix B show the 
kernel density of Marines’ Avg RS RV – Cumulative for Marine pilots and NFOs based 
on separation category.  
Additionally, the Marine Corps breaks Marines into thirds based off their RS RV 
scores. RS RVs from 93.34 to 100 are in the upper third, 86.67 to 93.33 equal the middle 
third, and 80 to 86.66 is the bottom third (USMC, 2015). I split Marines into thirds based 
off their Avg RS RV – Cumulative score. If a Marines Avg RS RV – Cumulative score is 
93.34 to 100 the Marine is in the Upper-Third, scores between 86.67 and 93.33 go in the 
Middle-Third, and scores between 80 and 86.66 go in the Bottom-Third. 
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c. Reviewing Officer Percent Below 
The RO comparative assessment is a FITREPs second main quantitative 
measurement. The RO is the RS’s boss and gives the MRO a ranking from 1 to 8 based on 
all the Marines the RO has known in MRO’s rank (USMC, 2015). The Marine Corps breaks 
Marines’ RO comparative assessment into three categories – percent above, percent with, 
and percent below. Percent above is the percentage of reports that have higher RO 
comparative assessment marks than the MRO. The percent with have the same RO 
comparative assessment marks as the MRO, and the percent below is the percentage of 
reports that have lower RO comparative assessment marks. The goal is to have a higher 
percent below because that means more Marines were marked lower than the MRO. I use 
RO Percent Below as an additional measure of how VSP and TERA affect the quality of 
Marine Pilots and NFOs separating during the drawdown. 
I also break Marines into three groups based off the where their highest percentage 
lie in the percent above, percent with, and percent below. I place Marines’ with the highest 
percentage in the percent above category in the More-Above group and consider them lower 
quality Marine officers. I place Marines with the highest percentage in the more with 
category or evenly split across the three categories in the More-With group and consider 
them average Marines officers. Finally, I place Marines with the highest percentage in the 
percent below category in the More-Below group and considered them high-quality Marine 
officers.  
2. Independent Variables 
Most of the independent variables in my study are self-explanatory and this section 
provides my reasoning for choosing them and for not choosing certain independent 
variables used in the Literature Review studies. The independent variables in this study 
deal with MOS, demographics, and FITREP.  
Marine pilots and NFOs have a primary MOS (PMOS) that identifies which aircraft 
they fly or ride in to talk on the radio and flip switches. I split Marine pilots into fixed wing 
and rotary wing groups and NFOs made a third PMOS group. These groups represent the 
largest distinction among Marine pilots and NFOs. It also represents the ease of 
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transitioning to the commercial airlines in the private sector. Fixed wing pilots have the 
easiest transition followed by rotary wing pilots while NFOs do not have an ability to 
directly transition to the airlines. 
Some pilots and NFOs have additional MOSs (AMOS) that indicate an additional 
qualification. I use Weapons Tactics Instructor (WTI), Aviation Safety Officer (ASO), and 
Forward Air Controller/Air Officer (FAC) AMOSs for pseudo performance characteristic. 
Marine pilots and NFOs can have zero AMOSs or multiple. My study does not include the 
new aviation AMOSs, such as 7533 Aircraft Section Lead, because those AMOS are not 
retroactively assigned to Marines already separated.  
My demographic variables are number of dependents, whether a Marine was prior 
enlisted, whether their degree is in the STEM field (Science, Engineering and Math), and 
if they have a post-bachelor’s degree. I code the dependents variable as an indicator to see 
if individuals with two or more dependents behave differently than those with less than two 
dependents. This variable essentially indicates whether or not the Marine has children. I 
also examine prior enlisted, because prior enlisted have more years in service than non-
prior enlisted at the same rank. Finally, I use STEM and post-bachelor degree to see if the 
type of degree an individual has plays a role in separation. STEM and post-bachelor 
degrees are typically relatively more valuable in the civilian labor market. 
In the in-depth probit models with attrition as the dependent variable, I use  
RS RV – Cumulative categories and RO Percent Below categories as an independent 
variable along with MOS variables. Conversely, in the Probit models with Upper-Third, 
Middle-Third, and Bottom-Third of RS marks and More-Below, More-With, and More-
Above RO marks as the dependent variables, I use attrition, VSP, and TERA as independent 
variables to estimate the quality of Marine pilots and NFOs leaving the Marine Corps 
through separation incentives. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To answer my research questions, I use an event study design instead of a 
Difference-in-Difference (DiD) approach. A DiD initially appears more applicable, 
because VSP and TERA were policy changes that happened to a group of individuals 
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during a certain period of time. It is natural then to estimate the difference in outcomes 
across time for the eligible population vs. the non-eligible. However, the nature of VSP’s 
and TERA’s implementation would confound any DiD estimates. Implementing it alone 
would be challenging as the treatment and control groups change each year and sometimes 
within a year. Also, the two communities that were not eligible for VSP and TERA were 
the F-35 and MV-22 communities, which were growing during this period. The control 
group is thus changing in a significantly different way than the groups eligible for VSP and 
TERA. In sum, there were multiple confounding events between the groups than just VSP 
and TERA, lending a DiD approach not credible. Instead, I apply regression methods and 
effectively use an event-study design to form estimates of the effects of VSP and TERA. 
1. Primary Research Question Model 1 
My primary research question asks: What was the effect of separation incentives, 
specifically VSP and TERA, on the separation of Naval Aviators and NFOs? Answering 
this question requires using descriptive statistics as well as Probit models to find the 
separation trends and characteristics of those that separated during VSP and TERA 
implementation. I begin by plotting separation codes across fiscal years 2008 to 2017 to 
see the movement of separations. My goal here is to see whether fiscal years 2013 to 2016 
display an increase in separations, giving us a descriptive snapshot of the data. 
Using the following Probit model adds additional context to answer the primary 
research question: 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9
Pr( 1) Pr{ ( 2 )
}
i iY X FWPilot NFO WTI ASO FAC Dependents
STEMDegree PostBachelors PEnlisted
α α α α α α
α α α
= = + + + + + + ≥
+ + +
  
where Yi=1 if the Marine i took up VSP or TERA, FWPilot=1 if i was a fixed wing pilot, 
NFO=1 if i was a NFO, WTI=1 if i was a WTI, ASO=1 if i was a ASO, FAC=1 if i was a 
FAC or AO, (≥2Dependents)=1 if i had two or more dependents, STEMDegree=1 if i had 
a STEM undergraduate degree, PostBachelors=1 if Marine i had a Masters or Doctorate 
Degree, and PEnlisted=1 if i was prior enlisted. 
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I first estimate the model over the study’s population of 6957 individuals. Then I 
restrict the sample to those individuals eligible for VSP or TERA. Finally, I use samples 
corresponding to each year of VSP and TERA eligibility – 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. 
My primary parameters of interest are the coefficients for FWpilot and NFO because these 
coefficients show differences, if any, in the VSP/TERA separation of fixed wing pilots and 
NFOs relative to rotary wing pilots.  
Next, I break down Marine pilots and NFOs into aircraft platform and add 
additional demographic variables to further evaluate VSP’s and TERA’s effect on Marine 
pilot and NFO separations. I use the following Probit model for a more in-depth evaluation: 
1 2 3 4
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where Yi = 1 if the Marine i took up VSP or TERA, AV8Pilot=1 if i was an AV-8B pilot, 
FA18Pilot=1 if i was an F/A-18 pilot, FA18WSO=1 if i was an F/A-18 WSO, etc. Female=1 
if i was a Female, Married=1 if i was a Married, MilitarySpouse=1 if i has a military 
spouse, White=1 if i was White, Hispanic=1 if i was hispanic, ServiceAcademy=1 if i 
graduated from a service academy, UpperThird=1 if Marine i was in the upper third of RS 
marks, and MoreBelow=1 if i’s percent below was greater than their percent with and 
percent above for RO marks. 
2. Primary Research Question Model 2 
My other primary research question asks: Were there possible tradeoffs in quantity 
and quality, as measured by FITREPS, of separations due to VSP and TERA among Naval 
Aviators and NFOs?  
 While the descriptive statistics mentioned above answer how VSP and TERA 
affected the quantity of separations, I use the following probit models to answer if VSP 
and TERA affected the quality of pilots and NFOs separating from the Marine Corps: 
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iY FWPilot RWPilot NFO VSP TERA
Separated Separated
α α α α α α
α α
= = + + + + + +
+
  
where 1iY =  if the Marine i is either in the Bottom-Third, Middle-Third, or Upper-Third 
category of RS marks, or 1iY = if Marine i  is either in the More-Above, More-With, or 
More-Below category of RO marks. The independent variables are the same for each 
model; the dependent variable is what changes across models. 
Also, VSP=1 if i took VSP, TERA=1 if i took TERA, Separated20082012=1 if i 
separated from the Marine Corps between 2008 and 2012, Separated20132016=1 if i 
separated from the Marine Corps between 2013 and 2016. 
These six models use the primary quantitative measurements in Marines’ FITREPs 
to show the effect VSP and TERA have on the quality of pilots and NFOs separating the 
Marine Corps. 
My primary parameters of interest are the coefficients on VSP and TERA, as they 
indicate the probability of which quality category a Marine will be in given he or she 
separated due to VSP or TERA. When using RSUpperThirdi or ROMoreBelowi as 
dependent variables, a positive VSP and/or TERA coefficient means VSP and/or TERA 
takers have a greater probability of being a high-quality Marine. Similarly, when 
RSBottomThirdi or ROMoreAbovei are the dependent variables, a negative VSP and/or 
TERA coefficient means VSP and/or TERA takers also have a greater probability of being 
a high-quality Marine. Differences between VSP and TERA coefficients within the same 
model indicates VSP and TERA have opposing effects on the quality of Marines who 




A. OVERALL SEPARATION CHARACTERISTICS 
Figure 4 shows the number of separations of Marine pilots and NFOs by fiscal year 
from 2008 to 2018. The separation categories are Retire, Complete Contract, VSP, TERA, 
and Other. The Retire category includes individuals that took a normal post-20 years of 
service retirement and is the largest separation category each year. There is a large increase 
in separations during the drawdown and most of the increase appears to be due to VSP and 
TERA. Of the total separations in 2013, 2.5% separated through VSP and 8.6% separated 
via TERA. In 2014 as eligibility increased, it was 15% and 12% for VSP and 
TERA, respectively. In 2015 as eligibility was modified, it was 7.5% and 13.3% for 
VSP and TERA, respectively. Additionally, separations decrease in FY 2016 when VSP 
is stopped and TERA eligibility is significantly cut. Figure 4 is evidence that VSP and 
TERA worked as needed to reduce the amount of pilots and NFOs in the Marine Corps. 




















Figure 5 breaks separations into FW pilots, RW pilots, and NFO MOS groups by 
fiscal year. FY 2014 has the largest increase in FW pilot separations from VSP and TERA. 
This is because FY 2014 has the largest eligibility for FW pilot MOSs. FW pilots were not 
eligible for VSP in FY 2013. Captains and Majors not selected for promotion were the only 
FW pilots and NFOs eligible for TERA in FY 2013 which accounts for the small amount 
of TERA separations in FY 2013 from their MOS groups. FW pilot separations from VSP 
had a large increase in FY 2014 and then diminished in FY 2015. While eligibility for FW 
pilots decreased from FY 2014 to FY 2015 it appears that any FW pilot that wanted VSP 
went ahead and took it in FY 2014. This could be due to individuals not knowing if VSP 
would be available in FY 2015 or because the Marine Corps denied applications of FW 
pilots requesting to separate via VSP in FY 2015. This is a large issue with evaluating VSP 
and TERA since the Marine Corps could deny VSP and TERA once the quota for 
separations was met for a specific MOS and I cannot see that in the data available.  
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RW pilots show an increase in separations from VSP and TERA throughout the 
drawdown years. There is a second increase in separations in FY 2015, but part of that 
increase appears to be from normal retirement. This could be from an increase in retirement 
eligible RW pilots, airline hiring, or SERB selections. However, what is important is VSP 
and TERA separations increased RW separations and those separations from VSP and 
TERA were relatively stable during the drawdown years.  
NFO separations do not appear to increase much during the drawdown. But the 
number of NFOs in the Marine Corps is relatively small compared to FW and RW pilots. 
Therefore, a large increase is not expected, but VSP and TERA do account for an increase 
in separations during the drawdown years. FY 2013 shows an increase in NFOs separating 
due to contract completion. This could be due to the Marine Corps forecasting the sundown 
of NFO platforms, F/A-18D and EA-6B, and NFOs see a lack of future opportunities in 
the Marine Corps for NFOs. Combining the drawdown and platform sundown likely 
incentivized NFOs to separate after contract completion more than usual.  
Figure 6 displays separations by rank from FY 2008 to FY 2018. Overall, Majors 
appear to be most affected by VSP and TERA, which is good because they were the target 
population. Majors are the mid-careerist in the Marine Corps that would usually stay at 
least until they meet the 20 YOS retirement requirement. VSP and TERA were incentives 
targeted to mid-careerist that were on the fence about getting out or staying until 20 YOS 
to go ahead and leave the Marine Corps. The increase in separations of Majors from FY 
2013 to FY 2014 is due to the increase in MOS eligibility from FY 2013 to FY 2014.  
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Figure 6. Marine Pilot and NFO Separations by Rank 
 
 
Interestingly, the Captain graph shows a small increase in separations from VSP 
and TERA during the drawdown. There is a noticeable increase in Captain separations from 
FY 2012 to FY 2013 due to contract completion. This could be similar to the increase in 
NFO separations discussed above where Captains see a drawdown of the Marine Corps as 
a decrease in future opportunities in the Marine Corps and decide to separate. This is an 
unintended consequence of the drawdown, but it also helps the Marine Corps meet its 
drawdown goals.  
B. DEMOGRAPHIC SEPARATION CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Dependent Variable: TERA vs. VSP 
The next question I ask is, “Who took up VSP or TERA?” In particular, I examine 
the demographic data of those that took VSP or TERA during the drawdown, and then the 
characteristics of those that took VSP only, and finally those that took only TERA. To 
evaluate the programs, I first compare taker characteristics among all pilots and NFO 
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characteristics among only those eligible for the programs. Finally, I compare taker 
characteristics by fiscal year. All probit results are marginal effects evaluated at the means 
of each independent variable.  
Overall, Column 1 in Table 3 shows being a WTI and having two or more 
dependents are the only characteristics that are statistically significant predictors of taking 
VSP and TERA during the drawdown for the study population. Being a WTI decreases the 
probability of taking VSP or TERA by 0.012 at the means. Since the WTI qualification is 
very specific to the Marine Corps, it makes sense that individuals with institutional specific 
training chose to stay in the Marine Corps. Being a WTI maintains its negative effect of 
taking VSP and TERA when the samples are broken into eligibility (column 2) and fiscal 
year (columns 3–5); however, WTI is not a statistically significant predictor in FY 2013. 
Table 3. VSP and TERA Taker Characteristic Models 
Data is missing from NFO, WTI, ASO, and FAC/AO for FY 2016 because Marines with those 
MOSs did not use VSP or TERA in FY 2016. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
R-squared 
Observations  6595  2403  591  2150  1810  194 
 (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.026)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.036) 
Prior Enlisted (d)  -0.005  -0.025  -0.065*  -0.011  -0.010  -0.008 
 (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.029)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.047) 
Post-Bachelors (d)  -0.004  -0.030*  -0.025  -0.035**  -0.019  0.009 
 (0.005)  (0.013)  (0.028)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.039) 
STEM Degree (d)  0.003  -0.003  0.015  0.007  0.005  0.039 
 (0.005)  (0.013)  (0.027)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.032) 
>=2 Dependents (d)  0.019***  0.014  0.041  0.019  0.015  0.021 
 (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.033)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
FAC/AO (d)     -0.000  -0.044***  0.016  -0.040**  -0.033*** 
 (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.027)  (0.014)  (0.011) 
ASO (d)  0.003  -0.026  -0.072**  -0.012  -0.016 
 (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.031)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
WTI (d)  -0.012*  -0.059***  -0.016  -0.035**  -0.041*** 
 (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.030)  (0.017)  (0.018) 
NFO (d)  -0.011  -0.038*  -0.085**  -0.035*  -0.011 
 (0.005)  (0.013)  (0.025)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.032) 
FW Pilot (d)  0.010  -0.005  -0.076**  0.004  -0.000  -0.015 
VSP/TERA 
 Overall  Eligible  FY2013  FY2014  FY2015  FY2016 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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Meanwhile having two or more dependents increases the probability of taking VSP 
or TERA by 0.019 for the overall population. This indicates that Marines in the aviation 
community with children are relatively more incentivized to separate by these programs 
than those without children. However, having two or more dependents loses its statistical 
significance when the samples are broken into eligibility and fiscal year. While the 
estimates for these sub-samples are not statistically significant, it remains economically 
meaningful and in the expected positive direction. For example, in column 3 in FY2013, 
having two or more dependents increases the probability of take-up by 0.04. 
FW pilots and NFOs have a lower probability of taking VSP or TERA in FY 2013 
by 0.08 and 0.09, respectively. This is expected since VSP and TERA were only offered 
to CH-46 pilots, RW pilots, in FY 2013. In addition, NFOs display a statistically 
significant lower probability of separation among eligible officers. NFOs lower 
probability to separate via VSP or TERA is logical because like the WTI qualification, 
NFO is a very military specific job and often referred to mean “No Future Outside.” 
FAC/AO is another qualification that decreases the probability of separating 
because of its military specific training, due to a high propensity of service, or both. It has 
a statistically significant effect at decreasing the probability by 0.044 among the eligible 
sample, 0.039 in FY 2014, and 0.033 in FY 2015.  
Individuals with a post-bachelor’s degree have a lower probability to use VSP and 
TERA among those eligible, but this effect seems to be due to FY 2014 separations since 
that is the only year where having a post-bachelor degree has any statistical significance.  
Individuals with STEM degrees do not have a statistically different probability of 
taking VSP or TERA compared to those without a STEM degree. This is surprising since 
individuals with STEM degrees presumably have better prospects outside the Marine 
Corps.  
Appendix Tables 9 through 11 report more extensive probit models, which include 
other characteristics related to who took up the programs. Overall these results show that 
each pilot MOS and NFO MOS is a positive predictor of being a VSP or TERA taker. 
Column 1 of Table 7 shows the CH-46 pilot MOS is the largest predictor likely because it 
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was the most eligible MOS for VSP and TERA. FW pilot MOSs behave relatively similar 
to each other as well as NFO MOSs. CH-46 pilots behave differently than the other RW 
pilot MOSs likely because of eligibility and it is a dying community. WTI, ASO, and FAC/
AO qualifications are still negative predictors of taking up VSP or TERA. Importantly, 
female, married, military spouse, white, Hispanic are not statistically significant predictors 
of VSP or TERA taker status. 
2. Dependent Variable: VSP vs. TERA 
Next I examine the characteristics of those who took up VSP and TERA separately 
to compare and contrast the characteristics of those who took up either program. Table 4 
shows the VSP takers’ characteristics, and Table 5 shows the TERA takers’ characteristics. 
While being NFO has a statistically significant negative coefficient in the previous 
model, it only shows statistical significance with VSP. Conversely, WTI, FAC/AO, and 
two or more dependents lose their statistical significance in the VSP only model while 
maintaining statistical significance in the TERA model. Being a WTI predicted the largest 
decrease in probability of taking TERA among those eligible at -0.091. Being a FAC/AO 
also predicted a significant decrease in the probability of taking TERA among the eligible 
population at -0.087. Having a post-bachelor’s degree and being prior enlisted produce a 
statistically significant negative probability of individuals taking VSP when compared to 
the entire population, eligible sample, and each fiscal year – except for prior enlisted in FY 
2013. Having a post-bachelor’s degree and being prior enlisted were the only statistically 
significant negative predictors among the eligible sample.  
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Table 4. VSP Taker Characteristic Models 
 
Data is missing from NFO, WTI, ASO, and FAC/AO for FY 2016 because Marines with those 
MOSs did not use VSP in FY 2016. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
                                                                                                    
R-squared                                                                                           
Observations                 6595            1793             336            1699            1491   
                                                                                                    
                          (0.003)         (0.009)         (0.020)         (0.009)         (0.005)   
Prior Enlisted (d)         -0.011***       -0.040***       -0.032          -0.040***       -0.017** 
                          (0.002)         (0.009)         (0.018)         (0.009)         (0.005)   
Post-Bachelors (d)         -0.012***       -0.042***       -0.046*         -0.041***       -0.018***
                          (0.003)         (0.010)         (0.021)         (0.010)         (0.006)   
STEM Degree (d)            -0.003          -0.014          -0.006          -0.011          -0.002   
                          (0.003)         (0.010)         (0.022)         (0.010)         (0.006)   
>=2 Dependents (d)          0.002          -0.004          -0.009          -0.001           0.002   
                          (0.004)         (0.011)         (0.037)         (0.011)         (0.006)   
FAC/AO (d)                  0.007          -0.003           0.059          -0.003          -0.007   
                          (0.004)         (0.011)         (0.023)         (0.012)         (0.007)   
ASO (d)                     0.003          -0.011          -0.017          -0.008          -0.000   
                          (0.003)         (0.011)         (0.030)         (0.012)         (0.006)   
WTI (d)                     0.002          -0.006           0.011           0.002          -0.006   
                          (0.003)         (0.010)                         (0.010)         (0.008)   
NFO (d)                    -0.010**        -0.038***                       -0.037***       -0.007   
                          (0.003)         (0.010)                         (0.010)         (0.006)   
FW Pilot (d)                0.001          -0.010                          -0.008          -0.016** 
VSP                                                                                                 
                                                                                                    
                          Overall        Eligible          FY2013          FY2014          FY2015   
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)   
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Table 5. TERA Taker Characteristic Models 
 
Data is missing from NFO, WTI, ASO, and FAC/AO for FY 2016 because Marines with those 
MOSs did not use TERA in FY 2016. 
 
Being a FW pilot decreased the probability of taking VSP in FY 2015 by 0.016 but 
increased the probability of taking TERA in FY 2014 by 0.33. The increase could be due 
to FW pilots not being eligible for VSP or TERA in FY 2013. Once they were eligible in 
FY 2014 a significant amount took TERA. The Marine Corps reduced FW pilot eligibility 
from FY 2014 to FY 2015 and reduced the eligibility again in the middle of FY 2015. 
These curtailments in FW pilot eligibility may explain the negative probability of FW pilots 
taking VSP in FY 2015. Alternatively, all of the VSP eligible FW pilots that were on the 
fence about staying or getting out of the Marine Corps took VSP in FY 2014 while there 
were not many eligible fence sitters in FY 2015.  
In sum, demographic characteristics such as gender, race, and ethnicity do not 
appear to be statistically significant predictors for take-up of VSP or TERA. With the 
exception of the CH-46 MOS, Marines had relatively similar taker probabilities within 
their respective FW pilot, RW pilot, and NFO MOS group. In addition, individuals with 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
                                                                                                                    
R-squared                                                                                                           
Observations                 6595            1196             522            1129            1048             194   
                                                                                                                    
                          (0.005)         (0.018)         (0.024)         (0.018)         (0.015)         (0.036)   
Prior Enlisted (d)          0.007          -0.040*         -0.044           0.015          -0.003          -0.008   
                          (0.005)         (0.018)         (0.029)         (0.016)         (0.015)         (0.047)   
Post-Bachelors (d)          0.009          -0.037*          0.016          -0.008          -0.013           0.009   
                          (0.004)         (0.019)         (0.026)         (0.016)         (0.015)         (0.039)   
STEM Degree (d)             0.005           0.009           0.017           0.026           0.006           0.039   
                          (0.003)         (0.023)         (0.026)         (0.015)         (0.014)         (0.032)   
>=2 Dependents (d)          0.017***       -0.002           0.023           0.032*          0.019           0.021   
                          (0.004)         (0.017)         (0.031)         (0.014)         (0.013)                   
FAC/AO (d)                 -0.006          -0.087***        0.011          -0.048***       -0.038**                 
                          (0.004)         (0.020)         (0.026)         (0.019)         (0.014)                   
ASO (d)                     0.000          -0.030          -0.037           0.009          -0.022                   
                          (0.003)         (0.017)         (0.027)         (0.014)         (0.013)                   
WTI (d)                    -0.012***       -0.094***       -0.024          -0.046**        -0.044***                
                          (0.006)         (0.034)         (0.032)         (0.030)         (0.027)                   
NFO (d)                     0.000           0.004          -0.044           0.017          -0.002                   
                          (0.004)         (0.020)         (0.025)         (0.017)         (0.017)         (0.032)   
FW Pilot (d)                0.009*          0.024          -0.022           0.034*          0.025          -0.015   
TERA                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                    
                          Overall        Eligible          FY2013          FY2014          FY2015          FY2016   
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)   
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Marine specific training such as WTI, ASO, and FAC/AO show a lower probability of 
taking VSP and TERA. Meanwhile having a post-bachelor’s degree and being prior 
enlisted are significant predictors of not taking VSP but not necessarily TERA. This is an 
interesting finding given that VSP was a lump-sum incentive while TERA was an annuity. 
Being prior enlisted likely indicates a high preference for military service. Additionally, 
prior enlistees are closer to retirement than those of the same rank, which makes VSP less 
appealing.  
C. PERFORMANCE SEPARATION CHARACTERISTICS  
My next set of analyses examines the job performance or quality characteristics of 
those who separated due to VSP or TERA, compared to those who stayed in the Marine 
Corps separated by other means. Table 6 displays the frequency counts of Marine Corps 
pilots and NFOs across the job performance distribution (in thirds) as measured by 
FITREPs, by separation status. Separation status is broken out to evaluate the difference in 
performance between those that took VSP or TERA and those that separated by a different 
means or those that have not separated. The numbers in bold in Table 6 correspond to 
statistically significant coefficients in performance models displayed in Tables 7 and 8. 
Table 6. FITREP Characteristics by Separation Status 
  
RS: Average Relative 
Value Cumulative Marks 
RO: Average Cumulative Marks 
  







VSP 3 87 13 23 47 33 103 
2.9% 84.5% 12.6% 22.3% 45.6% 32.0% 
TERA 26 107 19 81 45 26 152 
17.1% 70.4% 12.5% 53.3% 29.6% 17.1% 
Separated  
(not thru VSP or 
TERA) 
445 2525 314 1441 1211 632 
3284 
13.6% 76.9% 9.6% 43.9% 36.9% 19.2% 
Not Separated 254 2298 502 903 957 1194 3054 
8.3% 75.2% 16.4% 29.6% 31.3% 39.1% 
Total 728 5017 848 2448 2260 1885 6593 
11.0% 76.1% 12.9% 37.1% 34.3% 28.6% 
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1. VSP 
The first number that jumps out is only three individuals in the bottom third of RS 
marks took VSP. This amounts to 3 percent of those that took VSP and a 10 percentage 
point decrease compared to those that separated without VSP or TERA. This means lower 
quality Marines stayed in the Marine Corps instead of separating by taking VSP. Table 7 
shows that being in the bottom third of RS Marks decreased the probability of taking VSP 
by 0.086; this relationship is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level.  





VSP shows a similar trend of de-incentivizing lower quality Marines to get out 
while also incentivizing higher quality Marines to get out. Table 8 shows a lower 
percentage of Marines in the lower quality category of RO Markings (More Above) taking 
VSP compared to those that separated without VSP or TERA. Additionally, the percentage 
of high-quality Marines measured by RO marks taking VSP is higher than those that 
separated without VSP or TERA. Table 8 further shows that Marines with lower RO marks 
had a lower probability of taking VSP by 0.192 while those with higher RO marks had a 
greater probability of taking VSP by 0.141 and both were statistically significant. 
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Table 8. VSP and TERA Performance Characteristics Measured by 




Meanwhile TERA appears to have incentivized lower quality Marines to get out 
prior to the normal 20-year military retirement. Table 6 shows individuals in the bottom 
third of the RS marks are 3.5 percentage points more likely to get out with TERA versus a 
normal separation; however, when estimated through a probit model and controlling for 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
                                                                    
R-squared                                                           
Observations                 6593            6593            6593   
                                                                    
                          (0.016)         (0.015)         (0.012)   
Separated 2013-16 ~)        0.124***        0.046**        -0.154***
                          (0.017)         (0.016)         (0.011)   
Separated 2008-12 ~)        0.183***        0.032*         -0.194***
                          (0.043)         (0.037)         (0.040)   
TERA (d)                    0.105*         -0.075*         -0.034   
                          (0.037)         (0.050)         (0.052)   
VSP (d)                    -0.192***        0.084           0.141** 
                          (0.229)         (0.127)         (0.208)   
NFO (d)                     0.316          -0.224           0.021   
                          (0.203)         (0.189)         (0.200)   
RW Pilot (d)                0.319          -0.305           0.027   
                          (0.232)         (0.162)         (0.207)   
FW Pilot (d)                0.293          -0.257           0.046   
main                                                                
                                                                    
                       More Above       More With      More Below   
                              (1)             (2)             (3)   
                                                                    
Probit RO FITREP Models
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MOS group, RS marks do not predict a statistically significant difference in the quality of 
officers separating via TERA.  
RO markings show a 9.6 percentage increase in individuals with more officers rated 
above them taking TERA versus those that separate normally. It appears that the increase 
in low quality officers taking TERA came at the expense of the average quality officers 
since the officers in the more with group have a larger percentage point decrease compared 
to officers in the more below group. The probit model in Table 8 shows the probability a 
Marine taking TERA has a 0.105 higher probability of having lower RO marks and a 0.075 
lower probability of having average RO marks. This means more Marines with lower RO 
marks are taking TERA than Marines with average RO marks.  
Figure 7, illustrating the distribution of job performance by VSP or TERA, best 
illustrate these findings. Figure 5 displays the kernel densities for the Avg RS RV – 
Cumulative of Marine pilots and NFOs that used VSP or TERA (red broken line) compared 
to those that stayed or separated by another means (blue solid line). In sum, the quality 
distribution of who got out via VSP or TERA was more varied than the Marines that stayed 
or separated for other reasons. In other words, both high and low-quality Marines were 
incentivized to leave by VSP and TERA. In relative terms, VSP appears to have drawn 
fewer lower quality Marines to separate and more high-quality Marines to separate. This 
perhaps indicates that the lump-sum nature of VSP provided more incentives for higher 
quality Marines, while the annuity in TERA had a more distributive effect across the 
quality distribution. 
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Figure 7. Kernel Densities for Avg. RS RV – Cumulative 
 
 
Figure 8 is similar to Figure 5; however, the measurement is the Marines’ RO 
Percent Below, which a higher percent below corresponds to a higher quality Marine. 
Figure 8 shows VSP takers have higher RO Percent Below and are higher quality Marines. 
In contrast, TERA appears to incentivize lower quality Marines to separate further 
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In terms of predictors, my models show that gender, race, ethnicity, or marital status 
are not statistically significant predictors of Marine pilots and NFO who took VSP or 
TERA. With the exception of the CH-46 MOS, Marines had relatively similar taker 
probabilities within their respective FW pilot, RW pilot, and NFO MOS group. In addition, 
individuals with Marine specific training such as WTI, ASO, and FAC/AO show a lower 
probability of taking VSP and TERA. 
Regarding quality, VSP and TERA takers have wider Reporting Senior (RS) 
distributions than those that stayed or separated by another means. VSP also appears to 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The priority of VSP and TERA was to incentivize mid-careerists in the Marine 
Corps to separate and, without a doubt, it was successful in getting Marine pilots and NFOs 
to separate as shown in Figure 1 in Chapter I. Overall, 255 Marine pilots and NFOs used 
either VSP or TERA to separate from the Marine Corps between 2013 and 2016 on top of 
those that separated under other normal categories. The 255 separations from VSP and 
TERA over four years represents more than any full year’s worth of separations from 2008 
to 2012. In other words, VSP and TERA provided the Marine Corps with more than five 
years of separations in a four-year period and was an overwhelming success at getting mid-
careerist in the Marine Corps to separate. Another example of VSP and TERA’s success is 
the decrease in MOS eligibility from FY 2014 to FY 2015 and another cut in the middle of 
FY 2015. The one MOS that VSP and TERA did not decrease enough was the CH-46 pilots 
since they continued to be eligible for TERA until FY 2018.  
In terms of predictors, my models show that gender, race, ethnicity, or marital status 
are not statistically significant predictors of Marine pilots and NFO who took VSP or 
TERA. With the exception of the CH-46 MOS, Marines had relatively similar taker 
probabilities within their respective FW pilot, RW pilot, and NFO MOS group. In addition, 
individuals with Marine specific training such as WTI, ASO, and FAC/AO show a lower 
probability of taking VSP and TERA. Since the Marine Corps spends a large amount of 
money to train WTIs, ASOs, and FAC/AOs, it is positive to see those Marines have a 
statistically higher probability of staying in the Marine Corps despite the incentives to 
leave. Although most of these schools require a payback tour, the Marine Corps offered 
waivers for time-on-station and education payback during the drawdown. 
The quality of Marine pilots and NFOs separating significantly differ depending 
whether they took VSP or TERA. Lower quality Marine pilots and NFOs had a relatively 
lower probability of taking VSP as measured by both RS and RO marks while higher 
quality Marine pilot and NFOs had a higher probability of taking VSP as measured by only 
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RS marks. This is contrary to the augmentation policy the Marine Corps had during the 
drawdown, which increased the average quality of Marine officers remaining in the Marine 
Corps (Bacolod et al., 2017). 
The probit models show low-quality Marine pilots and NFOs had a higher 
probability of taking TERA as measured by RO marks. RS marks showed that low and 
high-quality Marines had an increased probability of taking TERA but neither were 
statistically significant. Since Marines Captains and Majors not selected to the next rank 
were eligible for TERA regardless of MOS, part of the eligible TERA population was low 
quality and contributing to individuals with low RO marks having a higher probability of 
taking TERA. In addition, lower quality Marine pilots and NFOs that were passed over for 
LtCol knew they had to retire at 20-YOS; therefore, they decided to retire early with TERA 
instead of waiting the extra years to meet 20-YOS.  
TERA also incentivizes a small portion of high-quality Marines to separate as 
shown in Figure 7. These might be high-quality Marines that always planned to retire at 20 
YOS. Once the Marine Corps offered TERA to their MOS, they jumped on the opportunity 
to leave the Marine Corps early with a reduce retirement annuity but full retirement 
benefits. This allowed them to transition to the civilian workforce earlier and giving them 
possibly greater lifetime earnings potential. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is hard to make recommendations to a program that met its top priority; however, 
two issues with evaluating the true effectiveness of the VSP and TERA programs is to 
know eligibility and know who applied for VSP and TERA. The Marine Corps does not 
have a way to readily identify Captains and Majors not selected for the next rank. Since 
TERA was eligible for Captains and Majors not selected for the next rank regardless of 
MOS, the Marine Corps does not have a completely accurate way to calculate TERA 
eligibility each year. Additionally, the Marine Corps does not have data stored in an easily 
access format about individuals denied VSP and TERA after applying. Without knowing 
all the applicants, the numbers of Marine pilots and NFOs approved for and separated with 
VSP or TERA calculates demand instead of accounting for all the individuals that applied 
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for VSP or TERA. I recommend the Marine Corps to make this information more readily 
accessible to evaluate the efficiency of programs such as VSP and TERA.  
Since quality Marine pilots and NFOs have a higher probability to separate under 
the VSP program, the Marine Corps should consider a quality adjustment offer for VSP. 
Since VSP was a lump-sum incentive while TERA was more of an annuity, it is also worth 
considering whether VSP takers were being rational in an economic sense. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The Marine Corps offered VSP and TERA to a large portion of the ground officer 
MOSs as well as enlisted MOSs during the 2013–2016 drawdown. Just as Marine pilot and 
NFO MOSs have different job opportunities in the civilian workforce, Marine ground 
officers have a greater distribution of jobs skills from easily translatable to the civilian 
workforce to not at all. Additionally, there are more ground officers in the Marine Corps 
than aviation officers, which will add to the sample population. Future studies evaluating 
how different ground officer or enlisted MOSs were affected by VSP and TERA will help 
in future drawdowns in determining which MOSs will be more responsive to separation 
incentives.  
VSP and TERA have opposing effects on the quality of officers separating the 
Marine Corps. The Marine Corps should determine if ground MOSs behave similarly. This 
could provide the Marine Corps with an ability to add a quality adjustment to VSP or TERA 
to incentivize the lower quality Marines to separate.  
Further research on the effects of the Blended Retirement System on separations 
also need to be considered when planning future drawdowns. In a future drawdown, the 
cliff style vesting of the current 20-year retirement system should not be as big of a 
motivating factor to keep mid-careerist in the Marine Corps. Therefore, the Marine Corps 
could get away with a lower VSP or TERA incentive. 
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APPENDIX. DETAILED PROBIT MODELS OF VSP AND TERA 
TAKER CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 9. In-depth VSP/TERA Characteristics Model 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
R-squared 
Observations  6595  2403  556  2150  1810 
 (0.005)  (0.020)  (0.031)  (0.014)  (0.011) 
More Below (d)  -0.006  -0.033  -0.066*  -0.018  -0.014 
 (0.008)  (0.021)  (0.065)  (0.019)  (0.017) 
Upper Third (d)  0.005  0.016  0.075  0.002  0.009 
 (0.005)  (0.017)  (0.031)  (0.014)  (0.011) 
Post-Bachelors (d)  -0.008  -0.023  -0.019  -0.024  -0.017 
 (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.030)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
STEM Degree (d)     0.002  -0.002  0.021  0.005  0.003 
 (0.006)  (0.017)  (0.039)  (.)  (0.013) 
Service Academy (d)  0.003  0.006  0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
 (0.011)  (0.032)  (0.075)  (0.024)  (0.028) 
Hispanic (d)     0.004  0.016  0.037  -0.027  0.017 
 (0.007)  (0.022)  (0.040)  (0.018)  (0.014) 
White (d)     0.004  0.024  0.025  0.031  0.015 
 (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.027)  (0.015)  (0.011) 
Prior Enlisted (d)  -0.004  -0.017  -0.066*  0.000  -0.006 
 (0.006)  (0.023)  (0.033)  (0.015)  (0.012) 
>=2 Dependents (d)   0.019***  0.038  0.073*  0.032*  0.025* 
 (0.015)  (0.046)  (0.115)  (0.038)  (0.041) 
Military Spouse (d)  0.016  0.052  0.107  0.038  0.051 
 (0.008)  (0.026)  (0.060)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
Married (d)  -0.001  -0.017  -0.054  -0.003  -0.014 
 (0.019)  (0.034)  (0.070)  (0.033)  (0.032) 
Female (d)  0.024  -0.003  -0.008  -0.004  0.021 
 (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Age  0.000  -0.006  -0.004  -0.005***  -0.002 
 (0.005)  (0.020)  (0.034)  (0.012)  (0.009) 
FAC/AO (d)  -0.002  -0.036  0.011  -0.035**  -0.028** 
 (0.006)  (0.017)  (0.026)  (0.014)  (0.010) 
ASO (d)  0.003  -0.024  -0.076**  -0.006  -0.014 
 (0.005)  (0.022)  (0.036)  (0.013)  (0.010) 
WTI (d)  -0.009  -0.038  -0.004  -0.025  -0.030** 
 (0.021)  (7.832)  (0.037)  (0.105)  (0.032) 
AH-1 Pilot (d)  0.056**  -0.371  -0.091*  0.092  -0.004 
 (0.018)  (8.752)  (0.058)  (0.083)  (0.027) 
CH-53 Pilot (d)  0.038*  -0.416  -0.046  0.034  -0.016 
 (0.024)  (3.013)  (0.030)  (0.118)  (0.035) 
UH-1 Pilot (d)  0.050*  -0.203  -0.102***  0.101  0.001 
 (0.034)  (4.004)  (0.070)  (0.142)  (0.063) 
CH-46 Pilot (d)  0.135***  -0.225  0.020  0.195  0.066 
 (0.025)  (4.166)  (0.037)  (0.103)  (0.029) 
KC-130 Pilot (d)  0.059*  -0.244  -0.089*  0.072  -0.011 
 (0.029)  (1.341)  (0.078)  (0.111)  (0.067) 
EA-6B ECMO (d)  0.054  -0.143  -0.033  0.075  0.025 
 (0.048)  (0.668)  (0.149)  (0.105) 
EA-6B Pilot (d)  0.109*  -0.116  0.155  0.067 
 (0.023)  (1.604)  (0.076)  (0.030) 
F/A-18 WSO (d)  0.017  -0.156  0.004  -0.012 
 (0.026)  (7.505)  (0.045)  (0.111)  (0.085) 
F/A-18 Pilot (d)  0.090***  -0.351  -0.077  0.124  0.087 
 (0.027)  (4.863)  (0.069)  (0.101)  (0.036) 
AV-8B Pilot (d)  0.077**  -0.265  -0.035  0.076  0.005 
VSP/TERA 
 Overall  Eligible  FY2013  FY2014  FY2015 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
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Table 10. In-depth VSP Characteristics Model 
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
                                                                                                    
R-squared                                                                                           
Observations                 6595            1793             245            1699            1431   
                                                                                                    
                          (0.047)         (0.010)         (0.590)         (0.022)         (0.011)   
More Below (d)              0.001           0.005          -0.012           0.008           0.001   
                          (0.023)         (0.011)         (1.660)         (0.015)         (0.039)   
Upper Third (d)            -0.000          -0.005           0.046          -0.004          -0.003   
                          (0.140)         (0.008)         (0.437)         (0.075)         (0.131)   
Post-Bachelors (d)         -0.003          -0.028***       -0.009          -0.028          -0.009   
                          (0.041)         (0.007)         (0.139)         (0.029)             (.)   
STEM Degree (d)            -0.001          -0.012           0.003          -0.011          -0.001   
                          (0.023)         (0.009)         (0.211)         (0.021)         (0.009)   
Service Academy (d)        -0.000          -0.006          -0.005          -0.007          -0.001   
                          (0.081)         (0.014)                         (0.034)         (0.036)   
Hispanic (d)               -0.002          -0.015                          -0.012          -0.002   
                          (0.049)         (0.012)         (0.263)         (0.035)         (0.090)   
White (d)                   0.001           0.011           0.006           0.012           0.006   
                          (0.123)         (0.009)         (0.281)         (0.063)         (0.102)   
Prior Enlisted (d)         -0.002          -0.020*         -0.006          -0.024          -0.007   
                          (0.073)         (0.009)         (0.116)         (0.021)         (0.101)   
>=2 Dependents (d)          0.002           0.009          -0.003           0.007           0.007   
                          (0.068)         (0.023)         (1.957)         (0.019)         (0.199)   
Military Spouse (d)         0.001           0.013           0.057           0.001           0.015   
                          (0.055)         (0.012)         (0.271)         (0.023)         (0.046)   
Married (d)                 0.001           0.007           0.006           0.008          -0.003   
                          (0.209)         (0.028)         (0.394)         (0.073)         (0.015)   
Female (d)                  0.005           0.020          -0.008           0.028          -0.001   
                          (0.020)         (0.001)         (0.155)         (0.015)         (0.033)   
Age                        -0.000          -0.009***       -0.003          -0.006          -0.002   
                          (0.110)         (0.009)         (0.581)         (0.009)         (0.038)   
FAC/AO (d)                  0.002           0.002           0.014           0.000          -0.003   
                          (0.078)         (0.009)         (0.238)         (0.010)         (0.017)   
ASO (d)                     0.002          -0.004          -0.005          -0.001           0.001   
                          (0.060)         (0.010)         (0.394)         (0.010)         (0.029)   
WTI (d)                     0.001          -0.003           0.009          -0.001          -0.002   
                         (31.758)                                        (10.002)        (46.089)   
AH-1 Pilot (d)              0.774                                           0.932           0.842   
                         (37.263)         (0.008)        (66.207)        (16.715)        (60.243)   
CH-53 Pilot (d)             0.676          -0.024**         0.717           0.867           0.735   
                         (32.679)         (0.012)                         (7.705)        (42.412)   
UH-1 Pilot (d)              0.792          -0.008                           0.945           0.877   
                         (21.731)         (0.024)        (11.354)         (7.813)        (19.472)   
CH-46 Pilot (d)             0.887           0.037           0.131           0.946           0.956   
                         (37.726)         (0.008)                        (15.642)        (69.078)   
KC-130 Pilot (d)            0.728          -0.023**                         0.882           0.724   
                         (36.911)         (0.011)                        (13.818)        (12.336)   
EA-6B ECMO (d)              0.763          -0.022*                          0.897           0.972   
                         (17.913)         (0.024)                         (4.857)                   
EA-6B Pilot (d)             0.921           0.007                           0.956                   
                         (43.512)         (0.006)                        (22.508)        (54.726)   
F/A-18 WSO (d)              0.668          -0.032***                        0.812           0.835   
                         (30.236)         (0.012)                        (12.493)                   
F/A-18 Pilot (d)            0.801          -0.001                           0.908                   
                         (30.343)         (0.010)                        (13.020)        (54.858)   
AV-8B Pilot (d)             0.816          -0.015                           0.906           0.813   
VSP                                                                                                 
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Table 11. In-depth TERA Characteristics Model 
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
                                                                                                                    
R-squared                                                                                                           
Observations                 6595            1185             487            1129            1048              89   
                                                                                                                    
                          (0.003)         (0.067)         (0.030)         (0.015)         (0.014)         (0.117)   
More Below (d)             -0.008*         -0.074          -0.038          -0.033*         -0.027           0.076   
                          (0.006)         (0.040)         (0.058)         (0.023)         (0.027)                   
Upper Third (d)             0.006           0.034           0.050           0.003           0.023                   
                          (0.004)         (0.018)         (0.029)         (0.017)         (0.014)         (0.064)   
Post-Bachelors (d)          0.001          -0.006           0.005           0.004          -0.008          -0.048   
                          (0.003)         (0.017)         (0.027)         (0.015)         (0.013)         (0.099)   
STEM Degree (d)             0.003           0.003           0.018           0.020           0.001           0.130   
                          (0.004)         (0.023)         (0.045)         (0.020)         (0.017)                   
Service Academy (d)         0.004          -0.014           0.043           0.009          -0.003                   
                          (0.009)         (0.065)         (0.081)         (0.034)         (0.041)         (0.240)   
Hispanic (d)                0.007           0.055           0.071          -0.009           0.029           0.153   
                          (0.005)         (0.037)         (0.039)         (0.021)         (0.021)         (0.115)   
White (d)                   0.000           0.035           0.004           0.018           0.005          -0.016   
                          (0.004)         (0.048)         (0.024)         (0.018)         (0.015)         (0.065)   
Prior Enlisted (d)          0.003          -0.053          -0.048*          0.022           0.003          -0.068   
                          (0.004)         (0.041)         (0.033)         (0.015)         (0.015)         (0.120)   
>=2 Dependents (d)          0.014***        0.041           0.046           0.045**         0.032*         -0.003   
                          (0.011)         (0.059)         (0.080)         (0.055)         (0.057)                   
Military Spouse (d)         0.008           0.030          -0.004           0.041           0.052                   
                          (0.007)         (0.067)         (0.064)         (0.036)         (0.030)         (0.131)   
Married (d)                -0.008          -0.064          -0.063          -0.028          -0.014           0.005   
                          (0.013)         (0.047)         (0.085)         (0.024)         (0.055)                   
Female (d)                  0.010          -0.038           0.024          -0.039           0.049                   
                          (0.000)         (0.022)         (0.003)         (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.007)   
Age                         0.001***       -0.026           0.002          -0.005**        -0.002           0.002   
                          (0.003)         (0.045)         (0.031)         (0.013)         (0.012)                   
FAC/AO (d)                 -0.006*         -0.049           0.007          -0.040**        -0.031*                  
                          (0.004)         (0.024)         (0.025)         (0.017)         (0.013)                   
ASO (d)                    -0.001          -0.019          -0.042           0.008          -0.020                   
                          (0.003)         (0.048)         (0.029)         (0.014)         (0.014)                   
WTI (d)                    -0.010***       -0.052          -0.024          -0.034*         -0.029*                  
                          (0.007)         (7.495)         (0.027)         (0.064)         (0.030)                   
AH-1 Pilot (d)             -0.000          -0.336          -0.072**         0.012          -0.019                   
                          (0.008)         (9.687)         (0.035)         (0.060)         (0.032)                   
CH-53 Pilot (d)             0.005          -0.407          -0.058           0.006          -0.012                   
                          (0.010)         (2.505)         (0.024)         (0.118)         (0.042)         (0.205)   
UH-1 Pilot (d)              0.007          -0.168          -0.075**         0.096           0.005           0.158   
                          (0.017)         (7.450)         (0.053)         (0.107)         (0.058)         (0.150)   
CH-46 Pilot (d)             0.040*         -0.309          -0.051           0.113           0.050           0.175   
                          (0.013)         (3.893)         (0.029)         (0.101)         (0.041)         (0.160)   
KC-130 Pilot (d)            0.022          -0.211          -0.065*          0.081           0.006           0.108   
                          (0.014)         (1.363)         (0.050)         (0.110)         (0.043)                   
EA-6B ECMO (d)              0.015          -0.125          -0.039           0.083          -0.013                   
                          (0.022)         (0.578)                         (0.142)         (0.118)                   
EA-6B Pilot (d)             0.023          -0.097                           0.131           0.083                   
                          (0.011)         (1.549)                         (0.098)         (0.053)                   
F/A-18 WSO (d)              0.002          -0.136                           0.050           0.015                   
                          (0.013)         (6.634)         (0.033)         (0.106)         (0.092)         (0.103)   
F/A-18 Pilot (d)            0.028*         -0.286          -0.063           0.129           0.098          -0.027   
                          (0.013)         (5.088)         (0.045)         (0.089)         (0.054)                   
AV-8B Pilot (d)             0.021          -0.246          -0.039           0.060           0.038                   
TERA                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                    
                          Overall        Eligible          FY2013          FY2014          FY2015          FY2016   
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)   
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